Abstract
Moreover, analyses that highlight the stifling role of domestic institutions and process over vision and strategy often run parallel to the notion of a non-existent -or at best passive-Japanese foreign policy, essentially reactive to decisions made by the country's major ally and hegemonic power, the US (Calder, 1988) . Domestic structural analyses have often characterized Tokyo's leadership in foreign and security policy at worst passive, at best reactive, but in both cases impersonal and consensus-driven.
Other scholars have understood Japan's foreign policy behavior within the equally stifling framework of structural theories of International Relations. According to these, an often anthropomorphized Japanese state is highly susceptible to international changes in the distribution of power and interests, or to the domestic and/or international penetration of particular ideas and identities, in line with the three great IR theoretical paradigms: Neo-realism, Neo-liberalisms and Constructivism. Kenneth Waltz's seminal study on international politics influenced an analytical approach to Japan's foreign policy that favors international structures and so-called third-level analysis (Waltz, 1979) . Interestingly, prominent scholars have often wedded domestic with external structures: Kenneth Pyle's brilliant historical overview of a cohesive Japanese political elite strategically susceptible to changes in the international distribution of power is a case in point (Pyle, 2007) . Not by chance, it transposes Waltz' approach to the study of Japan's international relations throughout its bi-millenarian history, where the Japanese elite has been keen in adjusting along changes in the distribution of power.
Other authors have presented an open-ended interaction between international structures with domestic debates on foreign and security policy. Richard Samuels and Narushige Michishita's studies leave space for human agency, but the 'Goldilock leader' that will pursue a strategy of 4 double hedging of maintaining the US-Japan alliance while deepening Japan's economic enmeshment with Beijing is a political leader and a reflection of the domestic debate (Samuels, 2006; Michishita et al., 2012) . In other words, their analysis emphasizes the role of the Prime Minister as a representative of the consensus among the political elite, thus stressing Morton Halperin's quip that "where you sit is where you stand."
This article aims at underlining, instead, the prominent role of personality alone that does not act in tandem with the domestic political debate, but is the reflection of deep-seated ideological beliefs, a proven driver of human behavior (Goldstein et al., 1993) . Institutional overhaul in Japan has allowed such change. Following electoral and administrative reforms in the 1990s, scholars' interest in prime ministerial leadership returned to prominence. Following the 1997 Big Bang administrative reforms by Prime Minister (PM) Hashimoto Ryūtarō, major institutional and legal sources of power have become available at the PM's disposal under a top-down decision making process centered in the Kantei, the Prime Minister's Office (Shinoda, 2007) . These institutional reforms have, in turn, emboldened leaders to push for divisive diplomatic decisions. Indeed, Abe's security agenda, one that was preoccupied with the resuscitation of initiatives aimed at recovering Great Power status, balancing more forcefully China's rise and at augmenting the coercive tools at Tokyo's disposal has lead political scientist Christopher W. Hughes to point at the dawn of an Abe Doctrine (Hughes, 2015: 8-27 ).
Yet, the new literature on Japanese leadership misses the enduring bureaucratic and US link that considerably aided Kantei-led diplomatic change. This article advances a 'hybrid model of Japanese leadership', where efficient leadership rests on an increasingly personalized and politicized link between Kantei, the US and the bureaucratic apparatus. To advance this claim, this study tests the role of specific foreign policies pursued by the seemingly presidential Abe administrations against the backdrop of very similar international and domestic structural constraints. Apart from introducing the role of prominent bureaucrats in the picture, preliminary evidence disproves both an eminently structuralist and an essentially agent-centered understanding of leadership in contemporary Japan, in favor of the above-mentioned 'hybrid leadership.' While structural constraints, such as the ever-present influence of the US and bureaucratic coordination may constrain options, effective leadership in foreign policy-making can indeed make a difference within those boundaries. 
Enter the Dragons: China and Abe Shinzō's Ascendance
This article uses the Abe administrations' China policy -specifically their consistent balancing policy-as a case study to operationalize Japanese prime-ministerial leadership. In fact, China's staggering economic and military rise caused tremendous fluidity in the regional environment, in turn augmenting the impact of individual leadership in Japan. Deep Sino-Japanese economic interdependence, a profound reciprocal cultural and technological debt, 2 and the need to tackle common traditional and non-traditional transnational security threats, albeit to varying degrees, are counterbalanced by unresolved territorial disputes, a growing security threat resulting from China's military rise, possible competition for energy resources, and reciprocal misunderstanding, rooted in bilateral historical and identity perception gaps. For the above reasons, the China question has loomed large in Japanese security debates during the post-Cold War years, becoming the foreign policy issue of the early 21 st Century -as evidenced by an ever growing number of publications on China's rise and on bilateral relations, which are typically titled or subtitled 'how to confront/face China' (Chūgoku to dō tsukiau/mukiau no ka?) (Miyamoto, 2010; Matsuda, 2010; Kokubun, 2011) . The answers raised in this lively debate have varied, and scholars have attempted to delineate the contours of the foreign policy discourse reflecting this above complex landscape (Mochizuki, 2007 , Michishita et alia, 2012 (Interview, 2014a) . But Abe and his foreign policy executive knew all along that China's military ascendance and its progressive advancement into the seas qualified as the long-term threat to Japanese security.
Within the broader strategic context of a multipolar regional order, this article argues that Abe aimed at a maximalist security agenda -maximalist by Japan's standards-along his own personal idiosyncrasies. China's military rise prompted Japan's security revolution and Abe tackled China's growing military clout through external and internal balancing: the former aimed at deepening Japan's security relations with strategic states, first and foremost the US, the latter 2 Up until the pre-modern age, Japan benefited and was greatly influenced by Chinese cultural and political institutions, as well as Chinese religious and political thought. The same could be said of China's debt to Japan's early modernization process in the late 19 th Century. That and Japan's so-called "developmental state" model influenced, respectively, the birth of China as a modern nation state and China's transition from a plan to a marketoriented economy with strong state interventionism. 6 centered on expanding the scope of Japan's own power projection and, in connection to that, augmenting the centralized foreign and security policy-making capabilities centered in the Kantei, the Prime Minister's office. But what role did the bureaucratic apparatus and the US government play in the formulation and implementation of these policies? To disentangle the complex genealogy of Abe's bold security agenda, the next sections map Abe's ideological outlook to define his foreign and security policy optima. Subsequently, I 'place personality in the context of the process of political causation, weighing up the respective impact of individual and contextual factors' (Hill, 2003: 109-110) in order to better understand the Japanese policy-making process along the aforementioned contours. Shortly, the article demonstrates the 'hybrid leadership' model through a rigorous process tracing of the external balancing of Abe 1.0 and Abe 2.0. The process tracing rests on extensive use of primary sources, where elite interviews have undergone extensive triangulation to substantiate the claims presented.
Abe Shinzō, an Idealist Power Balancer
Abe's nationalist outlook and his upbringing in the heart of the Liberal Democratic Party's establishment facilitated his ascendance to the front stage of Japan's political scene. He briefly Chōshū, heritage to kill two birds with one stone: the prefecture gave Abe a political platform to rise in the ranks of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) but it also enabled him to develop an identity as a nationalistic politician with a claim to historical legitimacy.
As a member of the foreign affairs policy tribe (zoku), Abe Shinzō devoted a considerable amount of attention to foreign and defense policy issues from the inception of his Dietary carrier.
Moreover, Abe's acquaintance with late Ambassador Okazaki Hisahiko in the early 1990s sparked the flame of interest into a strategic Realpolitik that was accompanied by a markedly strong distrust of communist China (Abe et alia, 2006: 160-165; Interview, 2013a) . Indeed, Abe's interest for security matters transpires not only through his personal manifestos and writings, but also through diplomatic briefings that detail his hands-on approach already during his tenure as Koizumi Indeed, Abe's policy preferences are relatively easy to discern, because his pedigree boosted his career, but also regimented his ideological contours. He echoed his maternal grandfather's figure, former Premier Kishi Nobusuke, who dominates Abe's writings, outweighing his father (Abe, 2006: 19-24, 28-31, 80-85, 135-136) . Kishi was a prominent member of the intra-Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) nationalist stream, which stood for policies of grand design aimed at reasserting Japan's autonomy and identity (shutai-sei), a concept that often recurs in Abe's writings. Concretely, these entailed an insistence on the exceptionalism of Japanese identity, one that remarked its primacy in Asia and its estrangement from the West, and a progressive detachment from the legacy of the US occupation of Japan, including the enduring dependency embedded in the unequal Trans-Pacific alliance (Magosaki, 2012: 187-208) . In all likelihood, it was Abe's privileged background and his cocooned political career that nurtured his right-wing idealism and shielded it from the harsh realities of political compromise, thus feeding into a consistent foreign and security policy agenda.
Indeed, Abe Shinzō's broader foreign and defense policy thinking presents striking similarities with his grandfather's . Specific to Japan's place in the world, Abe assigned explicit prominence to the 'homework left by the Kishi cabinet' (Abe, 2006b: 45) ; that is 8 constitutional amendment or, at the very least, the reinterpretation of the Constitution's Pacifist Article 9. This would allow Japan the right to rearm, and have a more equal partnership with the US by exercising the right of collective self-defense. But the second-step, his long term goal, was to 'break away from the post-war regime' (sengo rejīmu kara no dakkyaku), with a recovery of full-fledged independence and agency with the re-writing of the whole Constitution.
Indicative of the similarities with Kishi's two-step approach, during the first administration Abe consistently strengthened the Trans-pacific alliance scope also by swiftly implementing the previously agreed road map for realignment of US forces in Japan, and by aiming at reinterpreting the US-Japan Defense Guidelines for Cooperation (Abe, 2006a: 109-140; Hughes et alia, 2007:157-158) . But the mainstay of Abe's agenda was the ad hoc quadrilateral security framework (henceforth, quad) with the US, Australia, and India (Abe 2006a: 157-161 Abe's toolkit to domesticate an ascending China was a very traditional one: balancing. He explicitly betrayed his preference for China sticks over carrots in his manifesto book's chapter devoted to 'Japan, Asia and China' (soshite Chūgoku), which subtly disparaged Japan's neighbor from its very title. Here Abe denounces the problems and internal deficiencies of the supposedly egalitarian system under Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) rule (Abe, 2006a: 145-161) . On the contrary, he complains in his manifesto book about the tendency among Japan's Chinaconnoisseurs to become enamored with the mainland's long history and culture, thus impeding clear thinking on the issues a nationalistic and military rising China poses to Japan (Abe, 2006a:156-157) . His antipathy against China hands will have implications for China policymaking.
Finally, Abe's re-discovery of and insistence on Japan's democratic identity -Asia's oldestwas a nationalistic goal in direct relation with autocratic China's rise to regional economic primacy.
But these values didn't likely match the Premier's conservative political philosophy, according to which individual rights rested on the primacy of a strong nation-state capable of safeguarding them.
Values were epiphenomenal window dressing to the broader undercurrents of power politics.
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Christopher Hughes underscored the stiff ideological quality of Abe's foreign policy as a rupture, qualifying it as a contradictions-ridden doctrine aimed at the recovery of Japan's great power status. Moreover, while Abe aims at encircling China, it ends up being isolated (Hughes, 2015) . Sebastian Maslow, instead, contextualized Abe 2.0's foreign and security policy change within the broader evolution of Japan's security system, and qualified Abe-diplomacy as one of 'China hedging' (Maslow, 2014; Maslow, 2015) . Finally, Paul Midford has been more sanguine on the implications of Abe's security reforms: he has stressed continuity and downplayed the prospects of Japan's more active engagement in regional power politics, specifically the South China Sea (Midford, 2015) . Yet, these authors fail to notice the centrality of the China question to nationalist Abe as a driver of policy change; to the eyes of prominent Japanese right-wing revisionists like Abe, China qualified not just as Japan's main security threat, as testified by Green, but also as a rising source of Japan's political and identity emasculation. China was at the center of the debate, and, as mentioned elsewhere, Abe's quest for a powerful and proud Japan went hand-in-hand with his desire to more autonomously address the many challenges posed by it (Pugliese, 2015b) .
Validating Policy Beliefs: Abe's Security Policy Successes and Lessons Learnt
In tandem with bolstering Japan's home-bred military and security capabilities and defense posture, Abe 1.0 and 2.0 sought to confront China by deepening and widening the net of Japan's security ties with other states. The new Abe administration took up the geopolitical strategy nominally inaugurated by Foreign Minister Asō Tarō in autumn of 2006, the so-called Arc of Freedom and Prosperity. This was briefly rebranded as Japan's Asia Security Diamond and later it was raised to a global strategy, the Foreign Policy based on a Panoramic Perspective of the World-Map (chikyū zentai o fukan suru gaikō) (Yachi, 2013) . Concretely, these initiatives entailed geopolitical overtures to maritime states in the peripheries of the Eurasian continent. The aim was to establish a network of Sea Powers along the Eastern portion of the Eurasian rimland, on the belief that naval powers, such as India and Australia, were essential in keeping in check the Chinese continental power's advancement into the seas.
Yet, the first Abe government's focus on national security and foreign policy issues gave an image of a leader detached from mounting economic and social problems, contributing to his early resignation in 2007. Abe learnt from his previous government mistakes that he needed to focus on bread-and-butter issues to gain popular support at home, particularly given general antipathy for his security agenda. Thus, Abe's comeback premised on the Abenomics agenda with a new economic policy taskforce. Abe 2.0's stable premiership demonstrated that he had learnt from past mistakes.
But Abe learnt also from what he understood as his past successes. Differently from virtually all other policy fields, Abe reappointed exactly the same foreign policy executive within the premises of Kantei and MOFA. It could be argued that the pool of talent around Abe is limited and that not all of the re-appointed mandarins were selected because of their good performance but because there were no alternatives. Indeed, Hosoya Yūichi suggests that the rise of a particular strand of diplomats within MOFA, at the expenses of the so-called 'Asianists', is a structural factor in Japanese bureaucratic politics (Hosoya, 2011 ). Yet, evidence of political appointments and demotions -detailed below-prove that Abe cherry picked talent. This is a strong indication of his ideological preferences and of his appreciation of diplomatic results during his first term, because firsthand vindication of personal beliefs is a powerful driver of human behavior (Jervis, 1976: 239-248 ).
Shortly, Abe 2.0's firm security agenda premised not only on the Premier's worldview, but also on earlier personal and DPJ interaction with Beijing. As posited elsewhere, back in 2006
China accommodated to an increasingly assertive and still economically vital Japan (Pugliese, 2015a: 50-55) . Since Abe understood that Beijing's softened position in the mid-2000s was a result of Japan's hardened stance, the bilateral tension Abe confronted over the Senkaku/Diaoyu standoff required a forceful reprise of earlier balancing strategies; shortly, power politics and the recovery of Japan's great power status was part of a toolkit that would allow Tokyo to negotiate with Beijing on a position of strength. Moreover, Abe was conscious of the diplomatic debacles Japan had suffered under the well-intentioned DPJ administrations, confirming his belief that Chinese policymakers respected strength and that concessions would only embolden them. China's economic woes since at least 2013 and the destabilizing spillover effects on regime stability convinced Abe and his foreign policy team that China still depended more on Japan rather than vice-versa (Tsugami, 2013) . Successful personal experience, recent DPJ governments' failure, and China's slowing economic growth crystallized Abe's policy beliefs. The next section aims at understanding the policy-making mechanisms tapped by Abe. 
Operationalizing Abe's Hybrid Leadership
After highlighting Abe's consistent policy desiderata, how did Abe concretely operate during his first and second administrations? He did so through a combination of old and new sources of policy change. After all, Japanese Prime Ministers may cap institutional sources of authority to catalyze Cabinet members and government agencies' support, at both the policy formulation and implementation stages.
Sources of Policy Change: Personnel Appointments and Demotions
The most important source of authority has been the right over personnel management (jinji ken). The Prime Minister who made full use of this right was post-war Premier Yoshida Shigeru, who fully appropriated himself of the institutional prerogatives on personnel appointment and dismissal vis-à-vis both cabinet members and bureaucratic powerholders (Watanabe, 1961: 87-88 A scholar-cum-diplomat, Kanehara Nobukatasu, claimed that the Arc would have constituted Japan's Grand Strategy for the 21 st Century (Kanehara, 2011; Hosoya, 2011 (Interview, 2014b) . At any rate, in the author's opinion, Kanehara ought not to be qualified as the sole creator of the AFP because the eventual more assertive colors likely betrayed Yachi's input. The final product was necessarily a synthesis of idealistic preferences for universal values and geopolitics (Interview, 2013d) .
In the author's view, the original creator of the concept toed with greater emphasis the Abe and Yachi line, possibly because 'it is well-known among MOFA officials that those who do not belong to the Yachi grouping will be unable to get to the vice minister's post' (Akasaka, 2006: 234) . In fact, Kanehara's penchants originally emphasized a teleological historicism where a status-quo democratic Japan would have preserved global stability. In a sense, Kanehara advanced a defensive realist strategy, but the AFP concept would assume a logic rooted in a more assertive strand of balancing.
At the same time, the AFP embodies the complicated genealogy proper of the afore- Asia Democratization Initiative, which, however, never materialized during the second Bush administration (US Embassy in Tokyo, 2005) . In other words, so strong was the need for the Abe foreign policy team to balance China that strategic coordination with its ally was paramount, love calls echoed the George W. Bush administration's neo-conservative penchants and were instrumental to cementing the Trans-pacific entente. In fact, almost all of former and present MOFA interviewees agree in stating that the 'The Arc of Freedom and Prosperity was meant to appeal to the US and US leadership' (Interview, 2013e; 2014b; 2013b) . US-Japan alliance manager those who would have provided a moral leadership' with foreign and domestic audiences in mind (Interview, 2014c (Yachi, 2013 ).
Yet, it is worth recounting that the policy and declaratory changes that Abe 2.0 built upon were initiated under his first premiership but through a politicized link connecting Kantei with MOFA and echoing US discourses also for rational political calculus. freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law (Abe, 2006: 62-70) . In fact, Abe's calculus was nationalistic: the insistence on values sugarcoated Japan's identity with the mantle of political modernity to reassert Japan's primacy in Asia -in stark contrast with autocratic China; moreover, the Japanese government instrumentalized values to forcefully hug the US and augment its China balancing potential. Moreover, the new 'values-based' vocabulary tamed Abe's persona for foreign and domestic consumption, while his personal political philosophy was premised, on the contrary, on the primacy of the state over the individual and on Japan's cultural exceptionalism.
Policy
To be sure, at the dawn of the 21 st Century Japan already came to redefine its identity vis-à-vis China in new and, often, adversarial ways. Kai Schulze, for instance, has demonstrated Japan's rediscovery of its democratic identity -Asia's oldest -in direct relation with autocratic China's rise to regional economic primacy (Schulze, 2015: 101-116) . But these characterizations soaked Japanese official government pronouncements only after the advent of Abe 1.0 and Abe 2.0.
Following the 2012 Senkaku/Diaoyu standoff, the state-led value chasm widened even further following the consolidation of power of the Abe administration with evidence pointing at the active engagement of the Prime Minister's Office (Pugliese, 2015a: 76-93 ).
The two Abe administrations sought to establish the legitimacy of Japan's standing as a status quo Great Power, which consistently upheld the US-centered postwar liberal order. These discourses later intended to undermine China's unilateral claims in its multiple territorial disputes as attempts to erode the foundations of such a liberal order and, now and then, to legitimize the regime; Japan needed small cajoling to bless the 'largest democracy in the world'-exception to the NPT, because said democracy was a key chess piece to balance against China.
Importantly, the second Abe administration actively re-molded these antagonistic narratives, show that security cooperation with Australia was never discussed. Direct testimonies from Japanese and US policymakers testify, in fact, that MOFA was in control of the policymaking process bolstering security relations between Tokyo and Canberra and Asō and Abe's blessing was instrumental in giving mandarins the green light for said changes. In fact, like-minded policymakers such as Yachi and Kanehara were key middlemen (Anno, 2011: 31-32; Interview, 2014d; Interview, 2013e) .
Former Senior Director for Asian Affairs at the NSC, Michael Green, went as far as qualifying the United States as the middleman in the "arranged marriage" (omiai) between Australia and Japan back in the mid-2000s. US efforts were reinforced when Bush transferred former
Ambassador to Canberra, Thomas Schieffer, to Japan to smooth the road to security partnership between Tokyo and Canberra (Interview, 2013b) . The very visible hand of the US actively interceded in deepening security partnerships throughout the Asia-Pacific; in fact, Deputy
Secretary of State Richard Armitage echoed Green with regard to deepened India-Japan relations:
'we were the mid wife, we were the marriage broker' (interview, 2014f).
It's all the more telling of the echoes of history and of the exact same policy dynamics, that in 2014, the forceful neo-conservative premiership of Tony Abbott responded with enthusiasm to Tokyo and Washington's calls for deeper security cooperation. The further deepening of the JapanAustralia security partnership under the Abbott and Abe administrations, was déjà vu all over again and indicative of Japan's hybrid leadership. That key powerbrokers in Abe's foreign policy executive now resided within the Prime Minister's office hinted at the newfound leverage enjoyed by the Prime Minister's Office. While they were playing by the same China balancing book, the new-born National Security Council within the Kantei premises was in charge of policy formulation, while MOFA was in charge of policy implementation.
Conclusions: Widened Perimeters for Japanese Leadership?
The personal attributes of Abe and his confidantes impacted greatly upon the interaction with structure, style and policy outcomes. The Japanese government's attempted China policies 20 followed closely along the penchants of Abe and his entourage. Yet, this paper has demystified the traditional leader-centered accounts on Japanese diplomacy along a more inclusive picture that operationalizes it through the bureaucratic machine, specifically MOFA, and the key formative presence of the US ally.
With regard to the latter, it would be mistaken, however, to present an image of a Japanese state as reactive or altogether subservient to the cultural and discursive hegemony of the United (Zakowski, 2015: 64-105 ).
Finally, with regard to the bureaucratic machine's clout over foreign policy-making, as exemplified by MOFA, the newly-minted NSC is gradually relegating MOFA to an
